Toward wild psychometrics: Linking individual cognitive differences to fitness by Thornton, A et al.
Towards Wild Psychometrics: Linking Individual Cognitive Differences to Fitness
Alex Thorntona,*, Jess Isdenb and Joah R. Maddenb
a Centre for Ecology and Conservation, Department of Biosciences, University of Exeter, Penryn Campus, Treliever Road, Penryn, TR10 9FE, UK

b Centre for Research in Animal Behaviour, School of Psychology, University of Exeter, Perry Road, Exeter EX4 4QG, UK













Towards Wild Psychometrics: Linking Individual Cognitive Differences to Fitness

Abstract




Key words: cognition; evolution; heritability; individual differences; natural selection; psychometrics
The evolution of cognition remains one of the most poorly understood issues in biology. Traditionally, studies of cognitive evolution have employed a comparative approach, relating between-species or between-population differences in brain size or cognitive performance to differences in ecology, social systems or life history (e.g. Balda and Kamil 2002;. Pravosudov and Clayton 2002). A recent upsurge of interest in cognition among behavioural ecologists has stimulated the emergence of a powerful new approach, shifting the focus to differences between individuals. Just as field studies linking individual phenotypic differences to reproductive fitness have furthered our understanding of selection acting on behavioural and morphological traits (Clutton-Brock and Sheldon 2010), a focus on the causes and consequences of variation in individual cognitive performance can provide crucial insights into cognitive evolution (Thornton & Lukas 2012). A few pioneering studies have generated tantalising indications of how cognitive differences may impact on fitness correlates such as mating success (Keagy et al. 2009; 2011), reproductive success (Cole et al. 2012; Cauchard et al. 2013) and competitive ability (Cole and Quinn 2012). We support this approach wholeheartedly, but are concerned that the cognitive tests used in these field studies differ substantially from established psychological theory and practice.  Thus, it is questionable whether they have reliably characterised individual cognitive differences in wild animals. Here, we examine the criteria necessary to examine the fitness consequences of individual cognitive variation, and suggest refinements and improvements to current methods. 

First and most importantly, we must ensure that we are measuring cognitive differences and not variation in other traits or random noise. Cognition, broadly defined, encompasses the mechanisms by which animals acquire, process, store and act on information from the environment (Shettleworth 2010). Whereas morphology and behaviour can be measured accurately under natural conditions, cognitive processes cannot be observed directly and must be inferred through experimentation (Shettleworth 2010). Few studies in the wild have employed experimental protocols that can explicitly quantify individual differences in specific cognitive processes (but see Boogert et al. 2010; Nachev & Winter 2012; Isden et al 2013). Instead, research has more commonly relied on what we term the “problem-solving approach”, whereby animals in the field or temporarily brought into captivity are presented with novel problems, under the explicit or implied assumption that individuals that solve tasks at all, or do so faster than others, possess higher levels of cognitive ability (Keagy et al. 2009; Cole et al. 2012; Cole and Quinn 2012; Cauchard et al. 2013). Some of these tests elicit behaviour that is part of the standard repertoire of the species (e.g. male satin bowerbirds removing red objects from their bowers: Keagy et al., 2009; great tits removing obstructions from their nest-boxes: Cauchard et al., 2013). Others use more artificial tasks to elicit apparently innovative behaviour (e.g. pulling a lever to obtain food rewards; Cole et al. 2012). Such tests have been used to great effect in animal innovation literature to determine the physical and behavioural factors that influence individual tendencies to perform novel behaviours (e.g. Morand-Ferron et al. 2011), but we strongly doubt their ability to measure cognitive variability reliably. Under Shettleworth’s broad definition, all behavioural outcomes involve some cognitive processing, but this does not imply that solvers are necessarily more generally cognitively adept than non-solvers. Solving a new problem on a single presentation may be due to chance (e.g. knocking away an obstacle or lever by luck) or variation in factors such as strength, dexterity, motivation or persistence (e.g. Overington et al. 2011; Benson-Amram and Holekamp 2012; Thornton and Samson 2012). The studies we critique here certainly provide important controls for some of these variables, but all suffer from shared problems: contrary to standard practice in experimental psychology, they do not target any defined cognitive process and make no theoretically grounded, quantitative predictions as to what constitutes a correct outcome (see also Healy 2012). Consequently, there is no psychological basis for concluding that, for instance, a bird that pulls a lever is more cognitively able than one that does not. We suggest that future work should adopt lessons from psychometric research, where tests are designed to target specific cognitive processes and test outcomes can be clearly evaluated on the basis of correctness, giving quantitative scores of individual performance. One obvious improvement to the current approach is to present problem-solving tasks repeatedly to derive measures of individual instrumental learning ability from rates of improvement over successive trials. Tasks incorporating functionally relevant and irrelevant features could be particularly useful in assessing not only differences in speed of solving (which may reflect strength or dexterity) but also in the ability to learn the instrumental contingencies of a given task, and/or to transfer learned rules from one task to others with similar features (Thornton & Samson 2012). An additional approach is to design choice tests that make specific, defined cognitive demands such that once a subject is engaged in a task it must rely on its cognitive abilities to choose correctly between alternative options. Such an approach forms the basis for numerous robust psychometric tests (see Plomin 2001; Matzel et al. 2003) and has been applied in free-living animals. For instance, animals’ choices in field experiments have been used to determine whether they have remembered the location of food sources (Healy and Hurley 1995; Flores-Abreu et al. 2012), learned to associate rewards with specific shapes or colours (Boogert et al. 2010; Isden et al. 2013) or selected tools with appropriate functional properties (Visalberghi et al. 2009). The challenge is now to harness similar paradigms to quantify cognitive differences across large numbers of individuals, as is widely done in psychometric studies of humans and other animals (Plomin 2001; Matzel et al. 2003; Herrmann et al. 2010). Fortunately, recent technological advances have great promise in enabling rigorous, standardised testing. For instance, Nachev & Winter (2012) used computer-controlled artificial flowers to quantify the ability of individual pit-tagged wild bats to discriminate between different sugar concentrations. Similarly, building on their automated problem-solving tasks (Morand-Ferron 2011; Cole et al. 2012), Morand-Ferron and colleagues are developing instrumental conditioning choice tasks to record individual learning curves for hundreds of wild pit-tagged birds over repeated visits (Morand-Ferron, pers. comm.). These innovative applications of established psychological test paradigms to wild animals provide a much-needed impetus to the development of a robust science of wild psychometrics.

Having obtained robust measurements of individual cognitive differences, we must then determine whether these are associated with differential fitness outcomes. The relationship between cognitive performance and fitness may not be straightforward. Neural and cognitive phenotypes are often highly plastic, so performance measures may be sensitive to the conditions under which they are taken. Some birds, for example, undergo seasonal changes in hippocampal volume, which is likely to affect spatial memory (Smulders et al. 1995). “Problem-solving” measures in great tits are also sensitive to testing conditions: individuals’ success in captivity did not predict their success in the wild (Morand-Ferron et al. 2011). Where possible, we advocate testing animals repeatedly to determine the consistency and plasticity of cognitive traits. It is also important to note that investment in the neural tissue necessary for improved cognitive processing may generate concomitant costs for other important traits (Kawecki 2010; Kotrschal et al. 2013). We thus need measurements across a range of fitness associated parameters to determine whether elevated cognitive ability generates net benefits (Cole et al. 2012).  Finally, we must consider whether elevated cognitive performance could result in benefits accruing across several behavioural contexts, or only in specific situations. Natural selection is often assumed to fine-tune distinct cognitive mechanisms to meet specific ecological challenges (Shettleworth 2010). However, some cognitive processes such as associative learning are deployed across a broad range of contexts (Heyes 2012) and human psychometric tests indicate that an individual’s performance across a battery of disparate tasks can be summarised by a single measure of “general intelligence” (g) (Plomin 2001; Boogert et al. 2011 and Thornton and Lukas 2012 review the equivocal evidence for g in animals). To help resolve long-standing debates regarding modularity versus domain-generality and begin to pinpoint the selective advantages of elevated cognitive ability, we advocate the use of batteries of tests across different cognitive domains, coupled with measures of multiple fitness parameters. Following psychometric conventions, test batteries should incorporate tasks covering a range of pre-defined cognitive domains (e.g. association formation, instrumental learning, transitive inference, inhibitory control, spatial memory), with tasks designed to minimise effects of experience in one task on performance in others (c.f. Matzel et al. 2003; Herrmann et al. 2010; Isden et al. 2013).

Finally, selection can only act on cognitive traits if they are heritable, an issue which has attracted little attention beyond humans and a handful of laboratory studies on other species (Plomin 2001; Kawecki 2010). Measures of heritability in wild populations are likely to be complicated, with non-genetic factors including developmental conditions (Buchanan et al. 2013) and past learning opportunities (Thornton & Lukas 2012) affecting cognitive phenotypes.  Nevertheless, there are grounds for optimism that future studies will begin to disentangle ontogenetic and heritable traits. In particular, there is much to be learned from the animal personality literature, where techniques including cross fostering, experimental manipulation of individual developmental trajectories, selection experiments and quantitative genetic analyses are beginning to unravel genetic contributions to complex behavioural traits (van Oers et al. 2005).

Individual-based studies offer huge potential to inform our understanding of cognitive evolution. Laboratory research on human and non-human animals has generated overwhelming evidence that individuals differ in their cognitive abilities (Boogert et al. 2011; Thornton and Lukas 2012). A suite of pioneering studies have recognised that to understand how selection acts on cognitive traits we must now step out of the laboratory and examine this variation and its fitness consequences under natural conditions. However, the challenges of such an endeavour should not be underestimated. Critically, if this exciting new avenue of research is to progress, we must develop rigorous, psychologically-grounded experimental methods to identify and quantify explicit cognitive processes and their heritability, ideally using batteries of tests that call upon cognitive decision-making processes, spanning cognitive domains. Only then can we begin to examine how these underlying cognitive processes, either independently or in concert with others, can generate the behaviour on which selection may act.
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